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1. INTRODUCTION
For more than two decades, annual distributions of hundreds of thousands of metric tons of
food aid have been channeled into safety net programs designed to alleviate the impact of food
shortages in Ethiopia.  Despite the massive size and duration of this effort, there remain many
unanswered questions about its effectiveness and about its longer-term impact on the
population it is designed to benefit.  Recently, government and donor concern about
Ethiopia’s increasing dependence on food aid, coupled with the implicit demand for greater
accountability in its use, has spawned great interest and debate about how efficient the food
aid targeting system is in ensuring that food reaches those who need it the most (Sharp 1997).
A second, related fear is that large quantities of food aid, if poorly targeted, may depress
market prices for food and may result in domestic production disincentives (Jayne and Molla
1995; Molla et al. 1997; Maxwell et al. 1994).  Both of these concerns are expressed in
Ethiopia’s National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (TGE 1993a). 
While there have been numerous evaluative studies made by NGOs and others on the impacts
of specific food distribution programs in targeted areas, such studies tend to be qualitative,
very localized, and anecdotal in nature.  Almost always, they have been conducted by the
implementers or sponsors of the food aid programs.  A recent departure from this general rule
is a broad-based evaluation of food aid targeting in Ethiopia sponsored by Save the Children
Fund-UK (Sharp 1997).  This study covers a considerable volume of literature on the subject
and provides a broad overview of the issues.  It has helped to clarify the extent of our
knowledge about food aid targeting methods and under what circumstances they appear to be
relatively more or less successful, based on examples of the various food aid programs and
projects implemented in Ethiopia over the past several years.
Perhaps the most glaring void in our knowledge base on food aid targeting and its impacts is
that left by the absence of empirical research on the subject.  The need for a systematic,
quantitative analysis of targeting efficiencies is overwhelming, especially given the large
numbers of people concerned and volume of funds allocated to the problem of feeding
Ethiopia’s food insecure.
This paper examines the efficiency of food aid targeting in rural Ethiopia based on empirical
evidence from a survey of a nationally representative sample of 4,166 farm households
conducted by the Grain Market Research Project (GMRP) of MEDAC in collaboration with
the Central Statistical Authority (CSA).  The survey was administered in June 1995 and
covered the 12-month period from the beginning of the 1995 meher harvest to the beginning
of the 1996 meher harvest. 
Food aid targeting is here defined as “restricting the coverage of an intervention to those who
are perceived to be most at risk in order to maximise the benefit of the intervention whilst
minimising the cost” (Jaspars and Young 1995).  Our focus is on targeting at two levels.  We
first assess the degree to which the most food insecure areas (weredas) of the country are
selected for food aid distributions; within these areas, we then determine how successful food  Our focus on the food insecure as the primary target of food aid deliveries is consistent with
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national policy (TGE 1993a) and is the appropriate focus for research on the production and marketing
disincentive effects of food aid.  We recognize, however, that some members of the donor community in
Ethiopia contend that the food insecure should not be in all cases the primary target of food aid programs. 
Such alternative approaches to targeting are defended particularly in non-emergency cases aimed at
“development” objectives, such as school feeding program or the promotion of on-farm conservation activities.
2
aid programs are at reaching their intended beneficiaries—the least food secure households.
1
Targeting errors of inclusion (distributions to food secure weredas and households) and of
exclusion (no distribution to food insecure weredas and households) are estimated.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews historical trends in
food aid distribution.  Food aid targeting policies and practice are discussed in Section 3.
Research methods and data are described in Section 4, and research results are reported in
Section 5.  The paper concludes in Section 6 with a discussion of key findings, future research
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2. HISTORICAL TRENDS AND TYPES OF FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION IN
ETHIOPIA
The quantity of food aid delivered to Ethiopia has fluctuated from year to year, depending on
the extent of food supplied from domestic sources.  The annual volume of cereal food aid has
ranged from 200,000 metric tons to about 1.2 million metric tons or between 3.5% and 26%
as a proportion of total domestic food grain production over the 1985-1996 period (Figure 1).
Even in average years, the volume of
cereal food aid in a given region can
account for 25% or more of the total
marketed supply of grain, and up to
50% in drought years.  Depending on
the manner in which the food aid is
distributed, an injection of cereal food
aid of this magnitude can affect grain
market prices and/or domestic
production incentives.  This concern
has been felt both by the government
and donors, and the objective of
limiting food aid distributions to the
most needy and in ways that do not
negatively impact long-term
development objectives has become a
priority.  Also, changes in donor country agricultural policies, such as the elimination of the
Common Agricultural Policy in Europe and reduced support to farmers in the United States,
mean that food aid resources will likely become more scarce in the future and will almost
certainly not be available in the large quantities made available in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
A substantial portion (over 80% in bad years) of the total annual food aid flow to Ethiopia has
been used for emergency relief purposes (Aylieff 1993).  And in times of emergency, the focus
of food aid programs tends to be on the short-term objective of saving lives, rather than on
longer-term development objectives.  In more recent years, with the aim of linking relief with
development, the government of Ethiopia has placed greater emphasis on development-
oriented aspects of food aid programming.  During the period of January-May, 1996, for
example, the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (FDRE 1996) reports that
63% of the relief food was distributed through employment-generating schemes (Figure 2).
Results of the present study show that, in terms of actual kilocalories of food aid received
over a full twelve-month period, just over a third are linked to development programs.  Both
estimates are considerably below the current 80% development program goal of the
Government of Ethiopia as stated in the Food Security Strategy 1996 (FDRE 1996).
The major food aid commodities distributed in Ethiopia are cereals (93%), especially wheat,
maize, and sorghum; these are followed by oils and fats, and pulses.  Wheat constitutes the
largest share and accounts for about 80% of the total volume of food aid supplied between     Wheat Flour (2.5%)
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1992-1995 (Figure 3).  Sorghum and maize account for about 8% and 3% respectively, while
oils and fats make up another 3% of the total.5
3. TARGETING FOOD AID:  POLICY AND PRACTICE
Ethiopia’s official food aid policy states that no able-bodied person should receive food aid
without working on a community project in return.  This is complemented by targeted free
food aid for those who cannot work.  The official goal, as described above, is to expand
work-based food aid to the point where it accounts for 80% of all distributions (WFP 1995).
While emphasizing the need to give priority to disaster prevention programmes in all
development endeavours, the National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management
(NPDPM) states that disaster relief should ensure adequate income transfer for disaster
affected households, promote self-reliance among the beneficiaries, preserve assets to
promote speedy recovery, be geared to eliminate the root causes of disaster vulnerability, and
contribute to sustainable development.  The policy advocates: community participation, giving
priority to the most at-risk areas, coordination of efforts, and no free distribution of aid to the
able-bodied among the affected population (TGE 1993a; TGE 1993b).
According to the NPDPM, local-level responsibility for selecting food aid beneficiaries lies
with the wereda administration, which in turn is assisted by a committee of elders and
community representatives at the kebele or peasant association (PA) level.  Neither NGOs,
nor the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) have control over the
selection of beneficiaries for food assistance.  A list of beneficiaries is prepared and submitted
to NGOs and/or the DPPC by each wereda committee.  Wereda committees are comprised of
representatives of the PAs, the wereda Ministry of Agriculture office, and the wereda
administrative council. 
Fully efficient food aid targeting, as defined above, includes only those intended to benefit
from an intervention and excludes all those who are not intended to benefit from the
intervention (i.e., no errors of inclusion or exclusion).  But food aid interventions vary
considerably, causing differences in how, and how well, targeting is carried out.  Important
differences can be found in the type of intervention (e.g., free food, employment generating
schemes, food-for-work), the means used to identify the target group (e.g., self-,
administrative, or community targeting), the type and amount of benefits associated with the
intervention (e.g., kg of wheat or sorghum, litres of cooking oil), and the timing of the
intervention.  Of course, religious, cultural and political factors further complicate the
targeting problem if they feature prominently among the factors that need to be considered
when targeting beneficiaries.
Targeting methods can be broadly classified into three types:
Administrative targeting:  This occurs when the beneficiaries of an intervention are
administratively determined by those other than the intended beneficiaries, using such
indicators as asset or livestock ownership, age and gender, nutritional status, access to
resources such as land and family labour, etc.
Self-targeting: As the name implies, this type of targeting occurs when the type and amount
of the benefit attracts only those who are intended to be beneficiaries of an intervention. The6
use of below-market level wage rates and ‘inferior’ goods are typical of self-targeting
interventions. This is the method advocated by the Ethiopian  Food Security Strategy (FDRE
1996, p.25).
Community-based targeting: This is a targeting approach that involves community decisions
about the eligibility of households to participate in food aid programs.  Decisions are based on
community members’ prior knowledge of each household's food security situation and coping
ability.  
There is no targeting method that is universally effective.  Each type may work better under
certain circumstances and usually includes some elements of the others.  Many interventions
involve a combination of the three types of targeting methods.  For a detailed discussion of
the advantages and disadvantages of these targeting methods, the reader is referred to Sharp's
study of food aid targeting in Ethiopia (Sharp 1997).  It is important to note the unusual nature of this data set. It is extremely rare for data from
2
divergent surveys such as these (and funded from different sources) to be available on a common sample of
households. From a research point of view, this data set is unique in that, when merged, it will allow us to
examine research questions that link the four areas covered by the individual surveys. 
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4. DATA AND METHOD
4.1. Survey Data
The data examined in this research derive principally from a series of surveys conducted in
1995 and 1996 on a nationwide sample of rural households in Ethiopia.  The sample frame
and focus of the surveys are summarized below.
Sample Frame. From approximately 60,000 census enumeration areas (EAs) in Ethiopia, 614
were selected using a stratified random sample frame.  From each of the 614 enumeration
areas 24 households were randomly selected for enumeration under the Central Statistical
Authority (CSA) Annual Agricultural Sample Survey.  This survey program assigns one
enumerator to each of the 614 EAs.  Enumerators reside in or near their EAs and collect
agricultural information from the nearly 15,000 sampled households at key periods during the
year.
A 50% sub-sample (12 households from the original 24 in each EA) was randomly selected
for the CSA's Household Budget Survey and the World Bank sponsored Welfare Monitoring
Survey, both of which were conducted during two 2-month intervals: in June-July of 1995
and December-January 1995-96.  The Food Security Survey, the results of which are analyzed
in the present paper, was administered to a randomly selected sub-sample of 7 of these 12
households in July, 1996 for a total of 4,298 households.
Survey Contents:  The Grain Marketing Research Project is in the process of consolidating, at
the household level, data from the four surveys:  
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1)  Data from the CSA Annual Agricultural Sample Survey include crop production from
both agricultural seasons (Meher and Belg), farm size and land use, farm inputs use and
other farm practices, and livestock inventories. 
2)  The focus of the Household Budget Survey is on sources of income and both major
and everyday expenditures. 
3)  The Welfare Monitoring Survey emphasizes education, health status, housing
conditions, access to markets and social services, major assets owned, and nutritional
status (including anthropometry). 
4)  The Food Security Survey addresses a broad array of grain marketing and food
security issues. 
These include: grain production and marketing, food aid use, impacts of food aid program
participation, land ownership and use, household labor and demographics, and various8
farming practices.  Some of the key variables from the Food Security Survey examined in this
study are described below.
4.2. Key Study Variables
Data from the Food Security Survey constitute the primary empirical basis of the present
research.  Selected variables from the Annual Agricultural Sample Survey and from other
sources such as the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission are also reported.
Household food availability and food aid receipts are two variables that merit special attention
here because of their importance to our analysis of food aid targeting efficiencies.
Food Availability:  Household food availability is a variable that reflects the net amount of
food grains (including enset as a substitute for grains in certain regions of Ethiopia) available
for household consumption after adjusting for market transactions and food exchanges.  It is
computed as all inflows of food grains over the twelve month period November 1995 through
October 1996 minus all outflows (other than consumption) over the same period.  Since the
survey was fielded in June-July 1996, only after the first 8 months of the year-long reference
period, farmers were asked about how much grain, if any, they expected to sell or buy during
the remaining four months of the period (i.e., until the next harvest).  Because most grains are
marketed during the first months after harvest, farmers’ anticipated sales during the final 4
months amounted to a relatively small percentage (11.5%) of all food grain outflows during




Table 1. Household Food Availability byInflow and Outflow Cateory (Excluding Food
Aid)
Inflow/Outflow Category (in Kg) Outflows
Mean Household Food
Grain Inflow and Outflow Percent of Total Inflows or
Inflows
Production (Mehir) 1,117 74.6%
Production (Belg) 127 8.5%
Purchase 146 9.7%
Anticipated Purchases 87 5.8%
Exchanges Received 21 1.4%
Total Inflows 1,498 100.00%
Outflows (net of consumption)
Sales 297 83.4%
Anticipated Sales 41 11.5%
Exchanges Given 18 5.1%
Total Outflows 356 100.00%
Net Food Availability 1,142
Thus, household food availability is calculated as the sum of own production, purchases,
anticipated purchases, and food exchanges received,  minus sales, anticipated sales, and
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exchanges given.  Table 1 shows the mean household food availability in kilograms and the
relative importance of the various inflows and outflows.  On balance, after market
transactions and exchanges, farm households in Ethiopia had an average of 1,142 kg of food
grains available for consumption.  It is important to note that this measure of food availability
does not include food aid distributions.  We omit food aid distributions here because this
measure of food availability is the indicator of food insecurity or “vulnerability” against which
we will examine food aid receipts.  In some of the analyses presented in the following section,
food availability is reported as described here—on a kg basis; in other analyses it is converted
to kilocalories per adult equivalent per person-day.
Food aid:  Household food aid receipts, as reported by sampled households, is a variable with
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Figure 4
received and of what types of commodities, during which months, and under what types of
programs they participated (e.g., free food, food for work).  Overall, 20.0% of farm
households participated in food aid programs during the 1995-96 reference period.  Free food
distributions account for the largest share (64.6%) of food aid received by sampled
households, with the remaining 35.4% being distributed through food-for-work programs.
Consistent with historical trends, wheat is the most commonly distributed (nearly 60%) food
grain, though the proportion in wheat is lower than the normal 80% or so due to the local
procurement of food aid grains in 1995-96, notably sorghum and maize.  Peak months for free
food distributions were May through August; participation in food-for-work programs peaked
during April and May, when agricultural labor demand is relatively low. 
For purposes of comparison, we have aggregated food aid receipts across months and then
converted these annual totals to wheat equivalents and kilocalories.  To avoid redundancy in
the presentation of results, food aid amounts received from food-for-work and free food
programs have been combined.  This approach is based on the finding that, in nearly all
instances, the two types of assistance show similar patterns and lead to similar conclusions.
Exceptions to this general rule are duly noted in the text. 
Comparing our survey estimates of food aid receipts with those reported by the DPPC as
amounts delivered during the same 12 month period, we find striking similarities across all
major regions (see Figure 4).  Overall,
our survey estimates amount to
82.6% of the DPPC’s recorded
deliveries.  Since the DPPC estimates
also include deliveries to urban areas
and monetized food aid amounts, it is
expected that they should be
somewhat higher than the survey
estimates, which do not capture urban
and monetized food aid.  This
difference is especially evident in the
“other killil” category, which includes
Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, and Harrar,
all predominantly urban regions.  The CSA sample frame is designed to include only households reporting some crop production. 
4
The small proportion of households (1.2%) here classified as livestock-based and/or non-farm households are
due to slightly different definitions.  For present purposes, livestock-based households are defined as those that
produce less than one quintal (100 kg) of grains and possess five or more Tropical Livestock Units (TLU). 
Five TLU could consist of many combinations of animals (e.g., 2 cows and 36 sheep; a camel, three cows and
19 sheep; etc.).  Non-farm households are those with at least 500 Birr in off-farm income and no significant
crop or livestock production.
  The Government of Ethiopia has set the minimum acceptable weighted average food requirement
5
per person per day at 2,100 kcal (FDRE 1996). Conventional wisdom in Ethiopia is that grains constitute 80%
of the average Ethiopian diet, or 1,680 kcal.  The rest comes from enset (false banana), root crops and
livestock products.  This analysis assumes 80% of the minimum caloric requirement to originate from grains
and enset, which are used as the basis for our calculation of household net food availability.  We recognize that
the 80% figure represents only an approximate average for the country and that there is likely to be
considerable regional and household variation in this requirement.  We expect that data from the CSA
Household Budget Survey will enable us to develop regionally-specific estimates of kilocalories consumed from
grains and enset, for use in future analyses. 
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5. FINDINGS
We begin our review of findings with a discussion of the nature and scope of food aid
participation and need in Ethiopia, at both the national and regional levels.  This is followed
by analyses of wereda-level, then household-level food aid targeting results.  We conclude the
section with an examination of the determinants of food aid distributions in Ethiopia and
potential causes of targeting inefficiencies. 
The present analysis focuses exclusively on crop-based households.  The livelihoods of a small
number (1.2%) of households in the Food Security Survey sample are based either on
livestock production or non-farm activities.   Livestock-based households, often landless and
4
nomadic, are concentrated in the regions of Afar, Somalie and Tigray; non-farm households
are more broadly distributed across the country.  The food security and food consumption of
these two groups of non-cropping households are often defined in terms of the value of
livestock and animal products (including meat and milk), or in terms of their earnings off-
farm.  Because of comparability problems in evaluating the food security of these households,
they have been removed from the analysis.  
5.1. Nature and Scope of Household-level Food Aid Participation and Need in Ethiopia
Results show that approximately 5.0 million households (56.8%) are food secure households
(i.e., have available 1,680 or more kilocalories per person per day), while the remaining 3.8
million (43.2%) are deficit households (Figure 5).   In aggregate terms, the food secure
5
households have available to them 7.9 million metric tons of wheat equivalents.  The deficit
households show a total food gap of 1.4 million metric tons (difference between food
available and food needs at 1,680 kilocalories per person per day requirement).  Food aid
distributions reduced this deficit by approximately 8%, to 1.3 million metric tons.  If food aid
distributed to secure households had instead been given to deficit households (through better
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There is sufficient food available in the country, before food aid imports, to meet the
nutritional needs (1,680 kcal PPD) of the entire population.  Yet because food is unevenly
produced and traded, a large segment of the population, the food deficit population, lacks
access to the minimum nutritional requirement.  Food consumption in the food secure
households is, on average, nearly four times that of the deficit households. The Gini ratio of 
food availability in Ethiopia, based on these data, is 0.44, indicating high inequality in food
access.
In absolute terms, food aid received by food secure households (.13 m mt) is slightly more
than that going to food deficit households (.11 m mt).  In relative terms, food aid accounts for
5.7% of grain consumption among deficit households and 1.6% among food secure
households.
When expressed in terms of kcal per person-day, food aid distributions in 1995-96 are found
to be highly concentrated in Tigray, a historically food deficit region (Figure 6).  Tigray
received approximately 8 times the national average food aid distribution of 105 kcal per
person-day.  This regional concentration of food aid is evident in both free food and food-for-
work distributions.  All other regions received food aid distributions at or below the national
average.  In absolute terms, households in Tigray and Amhara regions were the beneficiaries,
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  Undoubtedly, food aid programs reached more weredas than this but, by chance, none of our sample
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households were among the beneficiaries in these weredas and thus they are classified here as non-food aid
weredas.  Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assert that not all weredas received food aid and that the targeting
process, however effectively it has been applied, has resulted in the distribution of food aid to certain weredas
and not to others, largely as reflected in the food aid receipts of our sample households.
13
Figure 6
5.2. Stage 1:  Targeting Weredas
Our analysis of food aid targeting efficiencies begins with a look at the selection of weredas
relative to the magnitude of their food deficit.  Wereda selection is the first stage in the
DPPC’s efforts to target food aid deliveries (DPPC 1995).  Their goal is to assess the food
needs of all weredas in the country and eventually to identify those areas of greatest
vulnerability, those in need of food aid intervention.
How efficient was wereda targeting in 1995-96?  Did the most vulnerable weredas receive
food assistance?  Answers to these questions can be gleaned from Table 2.  Overall, 41.5% of
the weredas in our sample contained one or more households reporting they received food aid
during the past year.
6
Efficient wereda-level targeting would mean that those weredas containing a large food deficit
population would be the recipients of food aid programs.  Table 2 shows the inefficiency in
the current system’s ability to target the most needy weredas.  Sampled weredas are classified
into quartiles according to the percentage of the sampled households in each wereda that are
food deficit (<1680 kcal per person-day).  For the first quartile (the most food secure), less
than 19% of sampled households in each wereda in this group fall short of their daily food
needs.  For the fourth quartile, at the high extreme, 71 to 100% of households in these
weredas are found to be food insecure.  If weredas were reasonably well targeted, one would
expect a higher percentage of weredas falling in quartile 4 to be food aid X 2
14
Table 2. Percentage of Weredas Receiving Food Aid by Level of Food Deficiency in
Wereda for the 1995-1997 Season
Food Aid in Wereda Weredas deficit) deficit) are deficit) are deficit)
Wereda Food Deficit Quartiles
All hhs are hhs are 70% of hhs 100% of hhs
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Low Moderately
deficit low deficit Moderately
weredas weredas high deficit High deficit
(o-19% of (20-41% of weredas (42- weredas (71-
Weredas Not Receiving Food Aid 59.3% 57.6% 59.3% 57.6% 58.5%
Weredas Receiving Food Aid 40.7% 42.4% 40.7% 42.4% 41.5%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N 91 92 91 92 366
   = .113       Sig = .99
recipients.  However, there are no significant differences across these quartiles in terms of the
percentage of weredas that are beneficiaries of food aid programs; all are within a single
percent of the national average of 41.5%. A linear correlation between wereda percent deficit
households and percent of households receiving food aid confirms the lack of statistically
significant association between these two variables (r=.07, sig.=.19).
Given the significant effort invested by the DPPC in assessing food insecurity and estimating
“affected populations” in these areas, it was a bit unexpected to find no positive association
between need and food aid deliveries at the wereda level. We suspect that the absence of
association is linked to the long-term build up and inflexibility of the food aid delivery system,
an issue taken up in our concluding discussion.
5.3. Stage 2:  Targeting Households
The second stage of food aid targeting occurs at the household level. As described in Section
3, household-level targeting can take on various forms. Self-targeting, administrative
targeting, community-based targeting, and their many hybrid variations are all methods used
in Ethiopia. The purpose of this section is not to compare these methods, but to assess the
effectiveness of local-level targeting overall. We look first at regional variations in household
food availability and food aid receipts, then at the age and gender of the household head as
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There is significant regional variation in the amounts of food available to households through
their own production and net transactions, and, most of all, through food aid receipts (Figure
7).  In the aggregate, households in
all five regions meet the 1,680 kcal
requirement for food availability per
person-day, even without the help of
food aid.  Because the 1995-96
harvest was unusually strong, it
departs from the historical trend of
deficit food production.  Again,
however, it is important to note that
despite high production overall,
inequalities in household food access
means that there is a large segment of
food deficit households in every
region.  In terms of food aid
distributions, the region of Tigray
stands out, despite maintaining a level
of food security comparable to other
regions. 
 Given our  earlier finding that food aid distributions in Ethiopia are sufficient to reduce the
country’s rural food gap by only 17%, even if perfectly targeted, it is not surprising that errors
of exclusion would far surpass errors of inclusion in the distribution of food aid. Indeed,
almost 80% of Ethiopia’s deficit households are excluded from the system (Figure 8). Errors
of inclusion, however, are significant
as indicated by the nearly 20% of food
secure households that are food aid
beneficiaries. 
To varying degrees, most regions of
the country conform to this national
pattern.  The one exception is Tigray,
where errors of inclusion actually
exceed errors of exclusion:
approximately 40% of Tigray’s deficit
households are not on the food aid
rolls, while nearly 60% of the food
secure households are.  This unusual
pattern of targeting errors in Tigray is
undoubtedly linked to the high per
capita flow of food aid to the region
reported earlier.  More food aid will nearly always decrease exclusion errors while increasing
inclusion errors. 
The Food Security Strategy (FDRE 1996) identifies a need to target the aged and orphans as
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communities holds that female headed households likewise constitute an especially vulnerable
group and should therefore be targeted for food aid.  The Food Security Survey has no
information on orphans, but from it we are able to isolate households headed by women and
the aged.
Our findings do not support the commonly-held notion that female-headed households are
more food insecure than are male-headed households.  Net food availability (kcal per adult
equivalent person-day) shows no significant difference when comparing male- and female-
headed households (Figure 9).  Despite their comparable levels of food availability, female-
headed households receive more than
4 times the level of food aid received
by male-headed households.  In other
words, women are being successfully
targeted, but this targeting may not be
appropriate.
Figure 9 also calls into question the
belief (conventional wisdom) that
elderly heads of households are less
food secure than younger household
heads.  Indeed, net food availability is
higher in households headed by
persons aged 60+ years than in
younger households.  Even though
older heads of households are no less
food secure than are younger heads,
they receive disproportionately more food aid by a factor of four.  Thus, as with female-
headed households, targeting the aged may not be appropriate. However, this does not imply
that gender and age inequalities do not exist within households—a proposition we are unable
to test using the current data set.
It is important to note that when broken out by type of food aid program, all of the “over-
targeting” of women and the elderly occurs in the distribution of free food; food-for-work
receipts show no significant differences by gender or age.
5.4. Wereda-Level Versus Household-Level Targeting
Food availability varies more between weredas (77.1% of variation) than within weredas
(22.9%), as shown in Table 3.  This suggests that targeting of food aid at the wereda-level
would have a greater payoff (all else equal) than targeting within weredas, i.e., at the
household level.
Variation in the food aid distribution follows the same pattern described above, with greater
variation between weredas (84.3%) than within weredas (15.7%).  This implies that food aid
targeting in Ethiopia does give more weight to targeting weredas than to targeting households
within them, which is consistent with the variation in food availability.17
Table 3. Comparison of Between Wereda and Within-Wereda Variation in Food
Availability and Food Aid Distribution
Food Availability Food Aid 
(‘000 Keal per person-day) (‘000 Kcal per person-day)
Mean Percent of Mean Percent of
Squares Variance Squares Variance
Between-Wereda Variation 37,141 77.1% 6,855 84.3%
Within-Wereda Variation 11,088 22.9% 1,278 15.7%
F ratio 3.35 5.37
F probability (sig.) 0.0000 0.0000
Thus, the problem is not one of not giving appropriate attention to targeting weredas, but, as
our results show, of failing to target the right weredas.  Though 77.1% of the variation in
food availability can be accounted for by targeting the right weredas, household targeting is
also important.  If we are interested in optimizing food aid distribution, there is clearly much
room for improvement at both levels.
5.5. Comparison of Successful, Actual, and Random Food Aid Targeting Scenarios
As shown earlier, though 41.5% of sampled weredas received food aid in 1995-96, these were
not always the most vulnerable weredas.  Similarly, though 20% of households received food
aid, these were not always the most vulnerable households.  To understand the parameters of
current food aid targeting and how it can be improved, it is instructive to compare the
efficiencies of actual food aid targeting with hypothetical best and worst case scenarios as
presented in Table 4.  In the “actual case” scenario, the percentage of households that received food aid (44.5%) was
7
slightly below the percentage classified as deficit in the selected weredas (46.6%).  This is a slight violation of
the assumption that food aid would be sufficient to cover all deficit households in the selected weredas.  The
resulting bias introduced is very minor and does not seriously affect the conclusions drawn from this
comparison.
18
Table 4. Comparison of Successful, Actual and Random Food Aid Targeting Scenarios





























































(>45.9% hhs w/food deficit) 41.5% 69.4% 72.3%  50.2% 69.4%
Actual: Actual Targeting of
Weredas in 1995-96 41.5% 46.6% 44.5% 20.7% 22.3% 46.6%
Hypothetical: Random Targeting
of Weredas 41.5% 41.5% 41.5% 17.2%  41.5%
For purposes of comparison across the three scenarios, we assume: 
1) that the amount of food aid available for distribution is sufficient to cover all deficit
households in the selected weredas,  and 
7
2) that resources and infrastructure are sufficient to reach a constant 41.5% of the
country’s weredas (see column a), the level currently achieved .
The middle row of Table 4 reports the results of actual targeting of weredas in 1995-96.  It
shows that 41.5% of weredas were targeted and that these weredas contained 46.6% of all the
food deficit households in Ethiopia (col. b).  Column (c) reports the percent of households in
the selected weredas that were deficit households, as opposed to food secure households.  Taking random targeting as the “worst case” scenario assumes that those in charge of food aid
8
targeting both at the wereda and household levels are genuinely committed to reaching the least food secure
households.  Of course the absolute worst case would involve “negative targeting,” or all food aid purposefully
going to the most food secure, but we find that such a scenario would not be heuristically helpful in this
analysis. 
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When compared to the top row, or best case scenario, we can see that actual practice (middle
row) is well below this theoretical maximum.  In this best case, the 41.5% of weredas targeted
are those with the very highest rate of food deficit (>45.9% deficit households).  Our results
show that these weredas contain 69.4% of all needy households, considerably higher than the
46.6% located in weredas actually selected.
Alternatively, the worst case scenario assumes a completely random selection (no targeting)
of households.   Where 41.5% of weredas are randomly selected, they will contain 41.5% of
8
all deficit households.  Compared to the actual practice scenario, current practice appears only
marginally more effective than the random case, isolating 46.6% versus 41.5% of Ethiopia’s
food deficit households.
The last three columns (d, e and f) compare the same three scenarios as they relate to
household targeting within weredas.  Beginning with actual practice, we find that 22.3% of all
deficit households were reached by the current food aid targeting system (col. e), again only a
marginal improvement over the 20.7% that would have been achieved through random
distribution to households within the selected weredas.  As reported in column (f),
theoretically perfect targeting of households would of course have reached all 46.6% of the
country’s needy households living in these weredas, effectively doubling the targeting
efficiency. 
We note that under current resource and infrastructure limitations, the very best that could be
achieved would be to reach 69.4% of the food deficit population.  The very worst, random
targeting, would reach only 17.2% of this population.  At the current rate of 22.3%, there is
little argument that the system shows room for improvement. Columns (d and f) also reveal
the relative merits of focusing on wereda versus household level targeting.  Fully successful
wereda targeting, coupled with random household distribution within those weredas, would
reach 50.2% of the food deficit population.  Conversely, random wereda selection coupled
with completely successful identification of needy households within them would result in a
lower, 41.5% targeting efficiency. 20
Table 5. Deficit Households:  Success/Failure of Targeting, Mean Size of Deficit and

















(c)     
Mean Food
Deficit After
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(kcal PPD)




 by Food Aid
(e)     
Wereda not targeted 53.4 722 0 722 0
Wereda targeted but household
not 24.3 734 0 734 0
Wereda and household targeted 22.3 765 452 313 59.1
      Total 100 735 101 634 13.2
Turning our focus to the 1,801 food deficit households in our sample (Table 5), we can begin
 to understand the impact of our targeting successes and failures.  As indicated above, only
22.3% (column a) of Ethiopia’s deficit households were food aid beneficiaries in 1995-96.
Another 53.4% did not receive food aid because their weredas were not targeted, and the
remaining 24.3% of deficit households were not selected as beneficiaries even thought there
were food aid programs in their weredas. Column (b) indicates that those who were targeted
differed little from those who were not, in terms of the degree of food deficit they faced;
deficits ranged from 722 to 765 kcal per person-day. 
The “success story” in this table, of course, emerges from the deficit households that were
fortunate enough to be selected as food aid beneficiaries.  Their average deficit of 765 kcal
per person-day was reduced by 313 kcal, or 59.1%.  To households living on the margin and
so badly in need of assistance, such an increase can have a substantial impact on their health
and well-being.  For these households there is a safety net in place and undoubtedly it is
making a difference.  When broken out by region, our data reveal that these households are
disproportionately located in the Tigray and Amhara regions. 
5.6. Determinants of Food Aid Distributions and Targeting Errors
The absence of association between food insecurity and food aid receipts causes us to probe
at the reasons for this unexpected finding and the food aid targeting errors from which it
arises.  By breaking out food aid distributions by level of food availability, region, and
historical pattern of food aid receipts, we hope to shed light on this question.  To estimate the
independent effects of key food aid determinants, this section concludes with a multivariate
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Table 6. Mean Food Aid (Kcal) Received per Person-day and Percent of Households

































 Extreme Food Deficit (<1000 kcal) 949 35.2 119 20.5 31 20.6 21 39.1 75 14.3 142 26.5
 Moderate Food Deficit (1000-1679 kcal) 197 13.2 100 25.9 19 20.0 42 26.8 8 14.3 58 22.2
 Moderate Food Security (1680-2799 kcal) 501 25.2 86 31.5 12 21.7 40 18.8 40 42.9 70 26.2
 High Food Security (2800+ kcal) 1,212 26.4 124 22.0 36 37.8 27 15.2 22 28.6 139 25.2
           Total 817 100.0 105 100.0 25 100.0 30 100.0 35 100.0 103 100.0
             (N=) 275 159 1,256 336 1,571 180 940 138 116 14 4,158 826
             Sig. 0.78 0.61 0.76 0.0  0.13 0.01  0.06 0.28  0.54 0.84 0.44 0.00
5.6.1. Food Aid Distribution by Household Food Availability and Region
To further examine the association between food availability and food aid distributions, we
have classified households into four groups based on their food availability (Figure 10).  The
lower two availability groups are
comprised of food deficit households:
the <1,000 kcal per person-day group
isolates the “extreme deficit”
households, many of whom consume
less than half the required minimum
1,680 kcal required from grains.  The
other is the “moderate deficit” group
that ranges from 1000 to 1,679
kilocalories per person-day.  The
remaining two groups enjoy,
respectively, moderate and high food
security, with the “high food security”
households consuming, on average,
twice the minimum kcal requirement.
An important feature of this figure is
the concentration of food aid among households in the two extreme categories of food
availability. While this is desirable for the extreme deficit group, we must question why it
appears among the high food security households.
The pattern of food aid distribution across categories of food availability shown in Figure 10
is broken out by region in Table 6. Concentrations of food aid among the two extremes, the
least and most food secure groups, is found in most but not all of Ethiopia’s major regions.
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food secure households, those with 2,800 or more kilocalories available per person-day.
Amhara and Oromia follow the same pattern, though less dramatically.  The Southern region
differs from the others in that its extreme groups receive less food aid than the two middle
groups.  Only the combined “other” group begins to conform to the goal of providing relief to
households that need it most.  It is important to note that although the F probability is not
significant for any of the overall distributions, selected individual values are significantly
different from other values.  Also, the finding that most regions show the same overall
distribution of food aid across categories of food availability markedly increases our
confidence in these estimates.
Table 6 also reports the percent of households receiving food aid by food availability and
region.  The results support the finding that the more food secure households are as likely or,
in some regions, more likely to receive food aid than are the less food secure households. This
is particularly evident in Oromia, where nearly 60% of the households receiving food aid
come from the more food secure groups. 
Thus, these findings suggest that the absence of association between food need and food aid
distributions may be due in large measure to the high volume of food aid flowing to the most
food secure households. 
5.6.2. Food Aid Distribution in 1995-1996 by Historical Pattern of Food Insecurity
Food aid distributions in 1995-96 closely followed the historical pattern of food insecurity in
Ethiopia. Figure 11 shows that
households are more likely to receive
food aid in the current year if they
received food aid in past years.  The
relationship is strong and significant:
food aid distributions grow
increasingly higher as the number of
past years of food aid increases. 
Households with 5 or more years of
food aid in the past receive more
food aid than all others by a wide
margin. 
Years of past food aid is an indicator
of the extent to which the food aid
system has built up presence and
infrastructure over time. The
existence of such a build-up is a
powerful predictor of ongoing food aid deliveries. Households in the regions of Tigray and, to
some degree, Amhara are the most likely of all to have received food aid in past years, a
reflection of the severity of drought and famine known to those areas.23
Table 7. ANOVA and Multiple Classification Analysis of Food Aid Distributions by
Food Availability and Region, Controlling for Covariates*















Food Availability (kcal) per person-day 0.484
   Extreme Food Deficit HHs (<1000 kcal) 141 117 97
   Moderate Food Deficit HHs (1000-1679 kcal) 58 72 71
   Moderate Food Security HHs (1680-2799 kcal) 70 76 75
   High Food Security HHs (2800+ kcal) 133 135 152
          Eta/beta 0.02 0.02 0.02
         
Region 0.000
     Tigray 829 824 455
     Amhara 99 102 64
     Oromya 23 22 80
     SNNPR or SEPA 30 29 86
     Other killil  35 38 79
     Eta/beta 0.13 0.13 0.06
*Covariates (sig.):  Age (.024) and sex (.023) of head; food aid in wereda (.763); land (.696); TLU
(.523); off-farm income (.976); household labor (.181); years of food aid (.000); and rainfall (.776). 
5.6.3. Food Aid Receipts: Analysis of Variance
To further examine the finding that food aid is concentrated at the two extremes of the food
availability continuum and to test whether the distribution holds up when other influences are
held constant, we conducted an analysis of variance and multiple classification analysis of food
aid receipts using total kilocalories of food available per person-day as the primary factor. 
The model also tests the independent effects of region as a determinant of food aid
distributions, and of other variables included in this study.  Table 7 above reports the results
of this analysis; we discuss them in the order reported.
Food Availability:  The unadjusted means in column (a) confirm earlier observations that
households in the extreme deficit and high food security categories tend to be the primary
beneficiaries of Ethiopia’s food aid programs.  Column (b) adjusts for the influence of region
on this distribution.  Our conclusion from Table 7 is that the relationship between food
availability and household food aid receipts is not conditioned by region.  Nor is it
significantly affected by a battery of covariates thought to have a potential impact (column c).24






Food Aid Receipts (Kcal)
Per Person-day
(beta)
Food availability per person-day (Kcal) 2,499 kcal 0.01  
Nbr years of food aid received over past 5 yrs 0.46 years 0.17*
Food aid in wereda (% other hhs in wereda wl food aid) 20.0% 0.01  
Livestock ownership (TLU) 1.68 TLU -0.01   
Tigray region (dummy) 1 = 6.6% 0.06*
Amhara region (dummy) 1 = 30.2% -0.01   
Oromya region (dummy) 1 = 37.8% 0.00  
SNNPR region (dummy) 1 = 22.6% 0.00  
Land holdings (ha) 1.2 ha 0.00  
Adult family labor (>14 yrs) 2.3 persons -0.02   
Years living in community 6.8 years 0.01 
Education of head of hh (scale: 1=illiterate to 8=post sec) 1.6 0.02 
Age of head of household (years) 44.4 years  0.04*
Sex of head of household (1=male, 2=female) 1 = 81.1%  0.05*
Off-farm income (Birr) 86 birr 0.00 
Avg rainfall in wereda (mm) 1,170 mm 0.00 
Avg elevation in wereda (m) 2,041m 0.00 
Region:  The powerful effect of region on food aid receipts remains strong and significant,
even when controlling for food availability (column b) and our set of covariates.  The flow of
food aid to Tigray is shown to be exceptionally high at all levels, though it is reduced from a
predicted mean of 824 to 455 kcal per person-day when adjusted for the influence of the
covariates.  The covariate primarily responsible for this reduction is previous years of food
aid.  In other words, part of the reason why food aid receipts in Tigray are so high in this
particular year (1995-96) is because they have been high there in past years and the aid
continues to flow.  Remaining differences in the amount of food aid received by households in
Tigray, compared to all other regions, are due to factors not measured in this study.
5.6.4. OLS Regression Model of Food Aid Receipts by Food Availability and Other
Determinants
The results of this linear regression (Table 8) reinforce what we have learned from the
preceding analysis of variance.  In short: food aid receipts are not determined by need (food
available per person-day). Rather, they are determined by: 
1) past participation in food aid programs, 25
2) regional effects (Tigray), and 
3) characteristics of the head of household—women and aged heads are targeted
independent of their need. 
Other variables such as off-farm income, livestock ownership, rainfall and elevation, and
residence in regions with relatively low food aid flow have no effect on household
participation in food aid programs.26
6. CONCLUSIONS, RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS, AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this study has been to examine food aid targeting efficiencies and the
determinants of food aid distributions in Ethiopia during the 1995-96 agricultural year.  Based
on data from a nationwide, randomly selected sample of 4,166 farm households we have
derived a set of findings and conclusions that we believe will help inform ongoing debate in
the area of food aid targeting.  Key findings from this study are summarized and discussed
below. 
Even in this relatively good harvest year, 43.2% of Ethiopia’s farm households are food
insecure, or have available for consumption less than the minimum daily nutritional
requirement of 1,680 kilocalories in grains.  Food aid programs, either in the form of free food
or food-for-work are vital to the health and well-being of these deficit households. Deficit
households, when properly targeted, succeed in raising their level of food availability from
735 kcal per person-day to 1,217 kcal, or by an average of 59% through the receipt of food
aid.  However, due to unsuccessful food aid targeting overall, only 22.3% of the deficit
households are selected as beneficiaries.  The remaining 77.7% of food insecure households
have no food aid safety net.
A key finding of the study is that there is no significant association between household food
availability (need) and food aid receipts (either free or food-for-work) during this sample
year—a result of high errors of exclusion and inclusion at both the wereda and household
levels.  This finding holds true even when controlling for other key characteristics of the
households such as age, gender, and education of household head, off-farm income, land and
livestock ownership, family labor availability, and fundamental agroecological characteristics
of weredas such as rainfall and elevation. 
Our results also show that, all else equal, improved wereda-level targeting has greater
potential for reducing these errors than does improved household-level targeting.  There is
greater variation between weredas in terms of household vulnerability than there is within
weredas.
Four factors have been identified as causes of the high level of targeting error and the
resulting low correlation between food insecurity and participation in food aid programs. They
are as follows:
Needy and well-off are beneficiaries:  First, the primary beneficiaries of food aid programs
are found to be households at the extremes in terms of food availability:  those with the least
food available and those with the most food available.  This pattern seems to hold across
numerous regions of the country.  While targeting efficiencies are enhanced by the provision
of food aid to the most vulnerable group, they are seriously reduced by the flow of food aid to
highly food secure households.  Sharp, in her 1997 review of food aid targeting in Ethiopia,
and Hill (1994) have alluded to the potential for community-level factors to unduly influence
the system in the selection of beneficiaries.  Such factors may include, “deliberate
manipulation of distribution systems by those in control... resistance by local authorities to the  Baito is the smallest administrative unit in the Tigray region, comparable to the peasant association
9
(PA), elsewhere in the country.
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general principle of prioritizing the needy, and the political use of food aid for electioneering”
(Sharp 1997, p. 34).  Our data do not permit us to count out these sorts of explanations for
why highly food-secure households receive the quantities of food aid that they do.
Over emphasis on women and the aged:  Second, the Food Security Strategy ( FDRE 1996)
and the beneficiary selection criteria used by several key NGOs involved in the distribution of
food aid underscore the special vulnerability of women and the elderly under conditions of
food shortages.  Our data show that a disproportionate number of female and aged heads of
households received food aid, irrespective of their food needs.  We found that households
headed by women and those aged 60 years and above are not less food secure than those
headed by men or younger farmers.  Thus, the practice of targeting women and the aged, to
the extent that it is used exclusively in place of truly need-based criteria, has contributed to
increased targeting error.
Lack of flexibility in the food aid system:  Third, the strongest determinant of food aid receipt
is the number of years in the past that households have received food aid.  This is largely
because years of food aid reflect the progressive build-up of “institutional capacity” in the
food aid delivery system over time.  By this we mean the investments made by government
agencies and NGOs in such things as personnel, contacts and knowledge of the area, offices,
trucks, and institutional reputation.  All of these investments create a compelling reason to
continue the flow of food aid to the same areas it has always gone—areas known for chronic
drought and food shortfall.  Because of the tremendous flow and momentum built up in the
food aid delivery system, altering its course to meet the needs of deficit households in other
areas that may not benefit from the same extent of infrastructure and institutionalization, is a
formidable challenge, one that was not met in 1995-96. Improving the flexibility of the food
aid delivery system to extend or shift the safety net when conditions require is a concept that
clearly needs greater attention; current inflexibilities in the system are a major cause of food
aid mistargeting in Ethiopia.
Regional concentration of food aid:  Fourth, households in the region of Tigray are far more
likely to receive food aid, regardless of need, than households in any other region, thereby
decreasing targeting efficiency.  Part of the reason for this disproportionate flow of food aid
to the region is that Tigray is one of the country’s historically deficit areas in which a
significant investment in food aid institutional capacity has been made.  The region also has
substantial community-based development projects and large public works programs (micro-
irrigation, dam construction, soil conservation, etc.) that are implemented as food-for-work
activities.  Because of the labor-intensive nature of these projects, it is conceivable that a large
number of food secure households may benefit from participating in them.  As Sharp (1997)
puts it, “despite the openness and fairness of the community targeting system in Tigray, the
tendency to spread food aid within communities, and the pressure on the baito  members to
9
include as many people as possible, seem to be the same here as elsewhere.”
But only about half of Tigray’s success in attracting food aid can be accounted for by such
built up capacity and infrastructure.  Multivariate analysis reveals that other factors must also  The Bellmon Amendment, Section 401(b) of the United States Government's Agricultural
10
Development and Trade Act of 1990 (the Farm Bill), the authorizing legislation for the PL 480 Title II food
aid, requires that:
        1) adequate storage facilities are available in the recipient country at the time of exportation of the
commodity to prevent the spoilage or wastage of the commodity, and 
        2) the distribution of the commodities in the recipient country will not result in a substantial disincentive
to or interference with domestic production or marketing in that country (USAID 1985).
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be taken into consideration, factors not measured in this study.  As with the finding described
above regarding the flow of food aid to the most food secure households, inconsistencies
between stated national food aid targeting goals and the delivery system as it is practiced, may
be worthy of deeper consideration and further research.  Such research should have two
objectives: first, to directly test the hypothesis that the institutionalization of food aid can be
detrimental to targeting objectives, particularly in harvest years that do not conform to
historical patterns; and second, to examine the types of disincentive effects that observed
targeting errors may exert on food grain production and marketing in areas where they may
occur, and to which the Bellmon Amendment is specifically addressed.
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We believe it is important to conclude this report by reiterating that this is a cross-sectional
study conducted during a relatively good harvest year.  Most regions of Ethiopia reported
strong agricultural yields, even the chronically deficit regions such as Tigray and Dire Dawa.
It is conceivable that in a more typical year, or even in a particularly bad year, that some of
our conclusions would differ from those reported in this study.
We must also note, however, that most of the improvement during good harvest years such as
this one invariably accrues to the more productive and already food secure households.  It is
estimated that during the relatively poor production years of the late 1980s, 52% of Ethiopia's
population fell below the 2,100 kcal per person-day (FDRE 1996).  By contrast, during the
current and relatively good year, with food availability up 30% or more above levels in the
late 1980s, the proportion of food insecure households has declined only modestly to 43.2%.
This suggests that the size and conditions of the 1995-96 deficit population may not be so
different after all.  Nonetheless, to answer this question and to strengthen the generalizability
of present findings, there is need to replicate this study during at least one average and one
relatively poor harvest year.
Based on the results of this study and subsequent discussions with major participants in the
food aid delivery system, several key study implications and recommendations for improving
food aid targeting in Ethiopia have emerged.  They are as follows:
6.1. Area Targeting
Increase flexibility in the food aid delivery system:  Ethiopia’s food aid delivery system
has built up capacity primarily in areas of chronic food deficit.  As a result, food aid
continues to flow to these historically deficit areas even in years such as 1995-96 when
some of the more severe food shortages are found in other areas of the country.  The key
challenge is to modify the system in ways that will make it more flexible, with the29
capacity to respond to food needs wherever they may occur.  The government of
Ethiopia, together with the major food aid donors and NGOs involved in food aid
deliveries, must begin to address this critical problem.  We believe that the most
successful approach will include an open forum for debate and review of available
options.
Emphasize area targeting:  More emphasis should be placed on identifying the most
food insecure weredas (area targeting) as the first step in the food aid targeting process.
Efficient area targeting has a greater likelihood of reaching vulnerable households, and
possibly at lower cost, than does household-level targeting.  lso, the effectiveness of
household targeting may be enhanced by accurate area targeting, at least in those areas
where all or most households are food insecure. 
Complete area targeting guidelines:  Current efforts by the DPPC in the preparation of
food aid targeting guidelines at the national and regional levels and for the various socio-
economic systems (sedentary agriculture, pastoralists, cash-crop producing areas, etc.)
should be finalized and implemented.
Coordinate crop production estimates: The Central Statistical Authority, the Ministry of
Agriculture, the Food and Agriculture Organization Crop Assessment Missions, and
others currently publish annual crop production estimates.  These estimates are often
inconsistent and, at times, even contradictory in their implications for food aid
programming.  As crop production estimates currently constitute the basis upon which
needs assessments are made, it is important that efforts be made to understand
differences in the methodologies used and to coordinate their interpretation for purposes
of a unified approach to food aid deliveries in Ethiopia. 
Improve early warning capacity:  Ongoing efforts by the DPPC to improve its early
warning capacity and methodologies should be strengthened.  A more accurate and
efficient early warning system constitutes an important element to improved area
targeting.
Expand area vulnerability profiles:  Current efforts by the DPPC to prepare vulnerability
profiles for disaster-prone areas should continue and be expanded to cover more areas.
Vulnerability profiles facilitate needs assessment and the identification of appropriate
interventions in the areas they cover.
6.2. Household Targeting
Underscore national policy on food aid targeting:  Consistent with the National Policy
on Disaster Prevention and Preparedness, priority should be given to targeting the most
food insecure and poorest of the poor households in emergency (employment generation
schemes) as well as food aid development (food-for-work) projects.  Wereda and peasant
association officials currently hold authority for the local-level selection of food aid
beneficiaries. Increased sensitization and awareness of the National Disaster Prevention30
and Preparedness Policy should be pursued aggressively to facilitate a better
understanding of the National Policy among those entrusted to implement it.
Rethink the guidelines and criteria used for identifying the most vulnerable households:
The current focus on women and the elderly is not an effective way to target food
insecure households.  Indicators that reflect household food availability per adult
equivalent will help improve targeting efficiencies. 
Eliminate local pressures that undermine effective targeting:  Actively reinforce the
importance of targeting vulnerable households and assist local-level food aid
administrators in eliminating the pressures and incentives to distribute food aid to the
more food secure households.31
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ANNEX 1.
GRAIN MARKET RESEARCH PROJECT HOUSEHOLD SURVEY (1995/96 CROP
YEAR): COMPARABILITY WITH CENTRAL STATISTICAL AUTHORITY
AGRICULTURAL SURVEY
Jean Charles Le Vallée
The household-level analysis in this report is derived mainly from two sources.  The Grain
Market Research Project (GMRP) household survey, implemented in June 1996, and the
Central Statistical Authority (CSA) Agricultural Survey, implemented in December 1995.  The
CSA survey is drawn from a nationally-representative sample of 14,800 households using the
CSA sampling frame.  The GMRP survey involved 4,218 households included in the CSA
survey (hence the GMRP sample is a sub-sample of the CSA survey) and is also nationally-
representative with respect to the major agricultural regions of the country, namely Tigray,
Oromiya, Amhara, and Southern Regions.  The following sub-regions are also considered
nationally-representative: Tigray (Tigray); North and South Gonder, East and West Gojam,
Agewawi, North and South Wello, Wag Hamra, North Shewa and Oromiya zone (Amhara);
East and West Welega, Illubabor and Jima, North, East and West Shewa,  Arsi, Bale, Borena,
East and West Harerge and Somali (Oromiya); Yem, Keficho, Maji, Shekicho, Bench, North
and South Omo, Derashe, Konso, Hadia, Kembata and Gurage, Sidama, Gedeo, Burhi and
Amaro (Southern regions).  The remaining smaller regions, Afar, Somali, Beni-Shangul and
Gumuz, Gambella, Harari, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, do not contain sufficient observations
for the survey to be considered strictly representative of their region.
The purpose of this annex is to present descriptive statistics on the comparability of key
variables contained in the GMRP Household Survey (1995/96 crop year) and the CSA
Agricultural Survey (1995/96 crop year).  This annex focuses on three key variables in
agricultural production: meher crop production, crop area cultivated, and household fertilizer
use.
For grain crop production, there are three different national estimates available for the meher
season: (a) farmer recall from the GMRP Household Survey; (b) farmer recall from the CSA
Agricultural Survey; and (c) crop-cut estimates from the CSA Agricultural Survey (Table 1). 
Crop cutting involves direct physical measurement within the fields harvested while farmer
recall estimates are obtained through surveying farmers after the crops have been harvested
(1-2 months after in the case of the CSA Agricultural Survey and 4-5 months afterward in the
case of the GMRP survey).
Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients of the three measures of production, with the
household being the unit of observation.  Strong correlations can be found between the GMRP
and CSA farmer recall estimates, particularly for maize, wheat, barley and millet.  Correlation
coefficients are generally lower between the CSA crop-cut estimates and either the CSA or
GMRP farmer recall estimates.34
Table 1. National Meher Grain Production Estimates
Source of Estimate Estimated Production (million metric tons)
GMRP Household Survey Farmer Recall 7.84
CSA Agricultural Survey Farmer Recall 8.51
CSA Agricultural Survey Crop-cut 9.27
As is the case with the CSA data, it is generally found that the measurement of production
from crop cuts result in higher estimates than the estimates from farmer recall.  A review of
the empirical tests of crop-cut versus farmer recall data collection supports the conclusions
that crop-cut estimates of production result in upward biases due to a combination of errors
(Murphy et al. 1991, Poate and Casley 1985, Verma et al. 1988).  These errors relate to biases
resulting from poorly executed techniques (Rozelle 1991), large variances due to
heterogeneity of crop conditions within farmer plots (Casley and Kumar 1988), and non-
random location of sub-plots and tendencies to harvest crop-cut plots more thoroughly than
farmers (Murphy et al. 1991).  Verma et al. (1988) found that farmer estimates are closer to
actual production (derived from weighing farmers’ harvests) than crop-cut estimates.  In
general, tests of crop-cut estimates in Africa have been found to be overestimated by  between
18% and 38% (Verma et al. 1988).  Farmer recall was also found to result in a smaller
variance in production estimates than crop-cut estimates.  On the other hand, crop-cut
estimates were found to provide more accurate measurements of crop yield.
Table 3 provides estimate of total cropped area by killil. Using the crop-cut method for
estimating area, the results give 8 million hectares nationally for both sample sizes.
ANOVA tests were made on production and area data to see if the sub-sample (GMRP
survey) was statistically different of the bigger sample size (CSA survey), in other words, if
the sub-sample was representative of the bigger sample if randomly selected. At the national
level and also at the regional level (i.e. killil), for all grains, we found no results that showed
that these two sample sizes were significantly different at the 0.01 level: thus the sub-sample is
representative of the bigger sample.
A comparison of mean household fertilizer use can be found in Table 4.  Both sample sizes
give very similar results.35
Table 2. Correlation Coefficients of the Three Measures of Production
Grain groups GMRP production (FR) CSA production (FR) CSA production (CC)
Maize GMRP production (FR) 1,000**
CSA production (FR) 636** 1000
CSA production (CC) 222** 128** 1000
Number of observations 2370 4352 4304
Wheat GMRP production (FR) 1
CSA production (FR) 702** 1000
CSA production (CC) 228** 269** 1,000
Number of observations 1106 2101 2120
Teff GMRP production (FR) 1,000
CSA production (FR) 470** 1,000
CSA production (CC) 384** 285** 1000
Number of observations 2112 4105 4044
Barley GMRP production (FR) 1,000
CSA production (FR) 676** 1,000
CSA production (CC) 347** 269** 1000
Number of observations 1391 2637 2613
Sorghum GMRP production (FR) 1,000
CSA production (FR) 410** 1,000
CSA production (CC) 423** 333** 1000
Number of observations 1852 3608 3552
Millet GMRP production (FR) 1,000
CSA production (FR) 622** 1,000
CSA production (CC) 416** 284** 1000
Number of observations 424 822 806
Pulses GMRP production (FR) 1000
CSA production (FR) 200** 1,000
CSA production (CC) 109** 224** 1000
Number of observations 1785 3354 3322
Oil seeds GMRP production (FR) 1000
CSA production (FR) 537** 1,000
CSA production (CC) 369** 103** 1,000
Number of observations 666 1250 1193
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)36
Table 3. Total Crop Area Compared Between Both Surveys
Killil n=14512 Area (MHa) FSS Survey n= 3653










Addis Ababa 98 96
Dire Dawa 74 59
Total 7.94 8.05
Table 4. Mean Percentage of Households Using Fertilizer by Killil.










Addis Ababa 97 79
Dire Dawa 34 2937
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